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Abstract
Background: The implementation of decentralisation reforms in the health sector of Tanzania started in
the 1980s. These reforms were intended to relinquish substantial powers and resources to districts to
improve the development of the health sector. Little is known about the impact of decentralisation on
recruitment and distribution of health workers at the district level. Reported difficulties in recruiting health
workers to remote districts led the Government of Tanzania to partly re-instate central recruitment of
health workers in 2006. The effects of this policy change are not yet documented. This study highlights the
experiences and challenges associated with decentralisation and the partial re-centralisation in relation to
the recruitment and distribution of health workers.
Methods:  An exploratory qualitative study was conducted among informants recruited from five
underserved, remote districts of mainland Tanzania. Additional informants were recruited from the
central government, the NGO sector, international organisations and academia. A comparison of
decentralised and the reinstated centralised systems was carried out in order to draw lessons necessary
for improving recruitment, distribution and retention of health workers.
Results: The study has shown that recruitment of health workers under a decentralised arrangement has
not only been characterised by complex bureaucratic procedures, but by severe delays and sometimes
failure to get the required health workers. The study also revealed that recruitment of highly skilled health
workers under decentralised arrangements may be both very difficult and expensive. Decentralised
recruitment was perceived to be more effective in improving retention of the lower cadre health workers
within the districts. In contrast, the centralised arrangement was perceived to be more effective both in
recruiting qualified staff and balancing their distribution across districts, but poor in ensuring the retention
of employees.
Conclusion: A combination of centralised and decentralised recruitment represents a promising hybrid
form of health sector organisation in managing human resources by bringing the benefits of two worlds
together. In order to ensure that the potential benefits of the two approaches are effectively integrated,
careful balancing defining the local-central relationships in the management of human resources needs to
be worked out.
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Background
Recruiting and retaining highly qualified health workers
in remotely located areas presents an enormous challenge
both in developed and developing countries. In both, the
urban areas are generally perceived as more attractive
because they are relatively more developed, and offer bet-
ter working and living conditions to the workers, their
families and relatives. Urban areas also seem to offer a
wider range of economic opportunities because health
workers can engage in private practice and other income
generating activities to supplement their salaries. It is not
surprising, therefore, for health workers to prefer working
in urban areas. Remote places shoulder a huge number of
public health problems and the associated challenge of
few health workers per capita [1].
There have been a number of studies from both high and
low income countries that attempt to analyse the most
central factors for effective recruitment of health workers
to remote places [1-4]. Most of these studies have focused
on the attributes of particular locations where the chal-
lenge is greatest. Personal attributes of the prospective
job-seekers or those who are already employed, such as
rural origin, socio-economic, demographic and family
background etc., have also been addressed. However, little
emphasis has been placed on the potential role of the
health sector organisation in recruitment. We shall argue
that the hindrances and/or opportunities inherent in the
health sector organisation (centralised or decentralised)
may have substantial implications on recruitment, distri-
bution and retention of health workers.
Our focus is on the implications of decentralisation vs.
centralisation policies for the recruitment and distribu-
tion of health workers in remote districts of Tanzania. This
country provides a unique case in the study of decentrali-
sation vs. centralisation as the country has experienced
major policy shifts in the recruitment of health workers,
from centralised recruitment to decentralisation of
recruitment procedures to a partial re-centralisation in the
recruitment system in 2006.
Decentralisation has been defined as a process that
involves one or all of the following aspects [5]: i) the shift-
ing of workload from centrally located officials to staff or
offices outside the national capital (deconcentration), ii)
the transfer of management from the centre to semi-
autonomous organisations and agencies within the public
service structure (delegation), iii) the transfer of political
and decision-making powers and authority for managing
public services to independently elected local govern-
ments (devolution), and iv) the transfer of management
and financing functions to a private organisation (privati-
sation).
The concept of decentralisation has become a catch word
not only within health sector reform strategies but also in
the overall policy and theoretical debates underpinning
the development literature [6,7]. However, it is by no
means a new concept. Decentralisation reforms gained a
special status during the earliest primary health care
reforms initiated by the World Health Organization
(WHO) following the Alma-Ata Declaration of 1978 [8].
This declaration emphasised that community participa-
tion is a crucial ingredient for the development of respon-
sive health-care systems both in high and low income
countries. Community participation was seen as being
achieved if more political powers and resources were
relinquished from the centre to the local government
authorities through a decentralisation process. Conceived
in the framework of the primary health-care philosophy,
decentralisation was supposed to ensure efficiency, effec-
tiveness and accountability in the management of health-
care services and resources [9,10].
There is a substantial body of literature on the decentrali-
sation reforms in the health sector both from middle and
low income countries. The literature largely centres on the
impact the reforms have had on health system change and
performance, with particular assessment of its influence
on equity and efficiency in terms of financing and delivery
of health services [11-15]. The reports have usually stated
that, due to the lack of adequate and accurate empirical
data, it is difficult to reach firm conclusions on the extent
to which health sector decentralisation reforms shape
health system change and performance. Moreover, such
studies have brought up the importance of contextual fac-
tors in shaping the processes and outcomes of the reforms
[6,11,12,16,17].
A few studies carried out in Tanzania have focused on
identifying the type of changes that decentralisation poli-
cies have brought about for the management of resources,
service provision, and accountability and good govern-
ance [18-20]. The results highlight both positive and neg-
ative effects. On the positive side, aspects such as the
increased authority of the district councils to spend user
fees to repair health facility infrastructure and purchase
drugs has increased the flexibility in planning for health
services at the district level. In addition, increased local
accountability is another aspect that has been consistently
brought up. On the negative side, the challenges related to
unclear and complex local-central relations in terms of
managing health sector resources has been highlighted.
Little emphasis has been placed on assessing the impact of
decentralisation reform on health worker recruitment,
and its implications for the distribution of health workers
across districts in the country. Evidence from other low
and middle income countries suggests that decentralisa-BMC International Health and Human Rights 2009, 9:9 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-698X/9/9
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tion reforms may have unintended negative implications
on the employment structure [21]. Decentralisation
reforms seem to have created or heightened internal
labour market competition and development of new ave-
nues for the uneven distribution of health workers across
local administrative units. This has led to an aggravation
of pre-reform inequalities in the distribution of health
workers [21-23].
We present the findings from an exploratory qualitative
study of the impact of the shifting centralisation-decen-
tralisation reforms on health worker recruitment in Tan-
zania. In particular, the opportunities and challenges
experienced by decentralised recruitment systems are dis-
cussed, as well as by the recent partly reinstated central
recruitment system. The recent policy shift gives us a
timely opportunity to investigate the benefits and bottle-
necks experienced in both recruitment systems. We argue
that there is a need to work for a fine-tuned balance
between decentralised and centralised management of
health worker recruitment. Ultimately, we aim to contrib-
ute further knowledge that can prevent quality health
services from being primarily an offer to the affluent
urban dwellers.
The following section sets out the context by focusing on
policy developments regarding the organisation of the
recruitment of health workers in Tanzania. The research
questions and methodology are presented in the subse-
quent sections. In the final three sections, we present and
discuss the results and summarise the main conclusions
and policy implications.
The context
Tanzania's socio-economic indicators and health system 
structure
The country is divided into mainland Tanzania and the
Zanzibar islands and has a population of 37.4 million
[24]. Tanzania is one of many sub-Saharan African coun-
tries with severe poverty. The average life expectancy at
birth is 45.6 years [24,25]. The latest Tanzania Demo-
graphic and Health Survey [25] revealed poor health indi-
cators with infant and under-five mortality estimated at
68 and 112 per 1,000 live births, respectively. Maternal
mortality is 578 deaths per 100,000 live births, with less
than half (43%) of all births in the country being attended
by skilled attendants [25]. These figures are comparable to
the other East African countries.
The health system in Tanzania comprises the public, the
private for profit, and the voluntary agency sectors. The
public health system is organised in a referral structure
that has a pyramidal form. The lowest level consists of
health posts and dispensaries. Above the dispensary level,
there are health centres and district hospitals. In districts
without a district hospital owned by the government, vol-
untary agency hospitals will serve as Designated District
Hospitals (DDH). Above the district level are the regional
hospitals. There are four tertiary hospitals at the highest
level.
The health worker census of the Ministry of Health and
Social Welfare (MoHSW) states that Tanzania has a total
of 48,508 health workers [26]. The country has 0.02 phy-
sicians per 1,000 inhabitants, the lowest in the world [27]
The public sector employs 70% of the health workforce
[28], and about 40% of the health workers are unskilled.
A recent analysis indicates huge inequalities in the distri-
bution of health workers between rural and urban dis-
tricts, with a range from 0.3 health workers per 1,000
inhabitants in one rural district to 12.3 health workers per
1,000 inhabitants in one urban district [28].
The centralised phase: pre-1982
Tanzania has a unique post-colonial history of early
implementation of socialist reform policies following the
Arusha Declaration of 1967. The period spanning from
the colonial period through Tanzanian independence to
1982 was characterised by a strong centralisation and par-
allel lack of a local government system in its real sense. All
production and distribution of economic and social serv-
ices, such as health and education, were centrally man-
aged. The socialist reforms implemented following the
Arusha Declaration were meant to, among other things,
reorganise the government administration to facilitate the
implementation of the post-independence policies, such
as massive investment in education and health infrastruc-
ture, and the creation of village cooperative farms [29].
The implementation of social policies under the auspices
of the Arusha Declaration created expectations from both
policy makers and the population that social services
would be extensive and effectively reach the whole popu-
lation. However, the effectiveness of socialist reforms was
limited, and the intention in the Arusha Declaration pol-
icies to decentralise power and authority to local commu-
nities were impossible following a 1972 parliamentary act
[30]. The 1972 act centralised power and authority even
further to the government, despite some degree of decon-
centration of tasks from the centre to the regions. In effect,
the existing (albeit weak) local governments at the district
level were removed by the 1972 act. From 1972 onwards,
all matters related to the management of public servants,
including the recruitment and distribution of health
workers, were controlled by the central establishment
office, known since the early 1990s as the Civil Service
Department (CSD).
In the health sector, one of the main challenges was soon
experienced to be the recruitment and distribution of
health workers. A serious mismatch between local needs
for human resources and the number of health workersBMC International Health and Human Rights 2009, 9:9 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-698X/9/9
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allocated to the districts by the central government was
among the main problems that were expected to be
addressed when Tanzania turned towards a more decen-
tralised structure of government.
The decentralisation phase from 1982
During the early 1980s, Tanzania prepared the ground
work for major decentralisation reforms. Six important
pieces of legislations were passed in 1982 [31-36]: a) the
Local Government (District Authorities) Act Number 7 of
1982, b) the Local Government (Urban Authorities) Act
Number 8 of 1982, c) the Local Government Finances Act
Number 9 of 1982, d) the Local Government Services Act
Number 10 of 1982, e) the Local Government Negotiating
Machinery Act Number 11 of 1982, and f) the Decentral-
isation of Government Administration (Interim Provi-
sions) Act Number 12 of 1982. These parliamentary acts
aimed to institute the local government with democratic
structures and institutions that had been paralysed by the
1972 Parliamentary Act [30]. Decentralisation gained fur-
ther momentum from the mid 1990s and onwards within
the framework of the Local Government Reform Pro-
gramme (LGRP) that was charged, among other things, to
ensure that districts have relevant and capable structures
of governance to manage their own affairs. Under this
arrangement, management of staff was expected to be
decentralised so that local government authorities could
appoint, develop and discipline their own staff [18,37].
To prevent unnecessary political interference in the
recruitment processes at the district level, the Public Serv-
ice Act of 2002 and the Public Service Regulations of
2003, inter alia, reduced the number of district council
members needed to form the Employment Board (cur-
rently there is only one member of the district council in
the board). From 1982 to 2002, the Finance and Planning
Committee, largely composed of local politicians, had
been the main body charged with the management of
recruitment at the district level. By strengthening the role
of technocrats in matters related to the recruitment of
workers at district level, unnecessary political interven-
tions in matters related to recruitment of workers were
expected to be reduced.
While the law provides the mandate to districts to manage
the recruitment of health workers, several central govern-
ment departments continue to have key roles in the man-
agement of workers at the local government levels: a) the
Ministry of Finance approves districts' budgets and sets
guidelines for the spending of locally mobilised financial
resources as well as central government allocations, b) the
Civil Service Department has a central role in approving
employment permits and, in collaboration with the Pub-
lic Service Commission, confirms health workers'
employment and manages their promotion, and c) the
Regional Administration and Local Government ministry
(currently under the Prime Minister's Office) approves
health personnel transfers from one district to another.
Practically, the recruitment process in the context of
decentralisation is supposed to take place hand-in-hand
with the budget process both at the local and central gov-
ernment levels. The estimates indicating the numbers and
types of workers, and the associated costs (personnel
emoluments), are discussed and recommended by all the
local governments' committees before they are tabled at
the full District Council for endorsement. After agreeing
upon the number and type of workers (e.g. cadres of
health workers) to be recruited in a particular financial
year, the budget estimates are presented to the Civil Serv-
ice Department for approval and processing of employ-
ment permits. At this stage, the Civil Service Department
either endorses the estimates or adjusts them depending
on what has been centrally approved by the Ministry of
Finance in the budget for the particular ministry. This
leads to an employment permit being issued, and the
respective district authority is informed so that vacancies
can be announced. The district authority is required to act
on the issued permit within a three month deadline, after
which it expires. After the information has been chan-
nelled to the district authorities, the District Executive
Director (DED) informs the district Employment Board
and the Public Service Commission of the existence of a
funded vacancy in the respective district. (Note that, the
Employment Board consists of a chairperson who is a
respected person in the respective district, one district
council member, a District Administrative Secretary or
his/her representative, a Local Government Officer from
the Regional Secretariat and a representative from the
Public Service Commission). Upon communication with
the Employment Board, the DED instructs the district's
Human Resources Officer to advertise the vacant posts in
the local and national media. After receiving sufficient
responses to the advertisement, the DED through the Dis-
trict Human Resources Officer prepares a shortlist of
applicants with required qualifications for the advertised
job. The Employment Board sets up a panel to interview
the short-listed candidates. At this point, the names of the
best candidates at interview are taken to the District Plan-
ning and Finance Committee for endorsement, and
finally the candidates are offered letters of appointment,
with copies to the Public Service Commission, the Civil
Service Department and the Ministry of Finance for infor-
mation.
Partial re-centralisation in the context of decentralisation: 
from 2006
Responding to a series of reported serious problems
related to the recruitment of health workers, teachers and
accountants under the decentralised arrangement, the
central government decided to reinstate in part a central-
ised recruitment system of health workers, teachers andBMC International Health and Human Rights 2009, 9:9 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-698X/9/9
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accountants through the issuance of a Presidential Estab-
lishment Circular (BC. 46/97/03/A/123) in November
2006. With this new circular, the government hoped to
improve the distribution across the country of health pro-
fessionals available in the labour market and those fresh
from training institutions. During the 'old' centralised
phase, districts would receive whatever was posted from
the central government. The new system of partial central-
isation provides more room for district authorities to plan
what they need in terms of numbers and types of health
workers, and to submit their requests to the central level.
Based on these needs, the Ministry of Health and Social
Welfare, the Public Service Commission in collaboration
with the Civil Service Department liaise with the training
institutions to find candidates to fill the identified gaps. In
addition, vacancy announcements are made by central
authorities to target those already in the labour market.
All the arrangements for short-listing and interviewing the
best candidates are also centrally managed before candi-
dates are posted to respective districts. We emphasise that
this return to 'centralised' recruitment procedures is by no
means a full retreat to a pre-decentralisation recruitment
mechanisms. The districts have an upper hand in some
crucial processes, such as in identifying the requirements
for health workers and managing the budget processes at
the local level. They also have a final say in accepting or
rejecting the posted candidates.
Research questions
Decentralisation reforms are expected to make the govern-
ment more responsive to local needs through better utili-
sation of local information and stronger accountability
systems. Delays in planning and executing plans may be
reduced through less overload and congestion in the
channels of administration and communication, and
through simpler bureaucratic procedures. Ultimately, the
quantity and quality of public services may improve
[9,17,21,37].
We investigated how these and other mechanisms have
unfolded in the specific context of recruitment of health
workers in Tanzania. Firstly, we asked how decentralisa-
tion has affected the responsiveness to local needs and the
accountability systems in relation to the recruitment of
health workers. Secondly, we explored whether decentral-
isation leads to less bureaucracy and more efficient proc-
esses of health worker recruitment. Thirdly, we focused on
the possibility that decentralisation heightens the compe-
tition between districts for qualified workers, and how the




We conducted a qualitative exploratory study between
August and September 2007. It was carried out at district
and national levels in Tanzania. Five districts of mainland
Tanzania were included, namely Ngara District (Kagera
Region), Meatu, Bukombe and Bariadi Districts (Shin-
yanga Region) and Kongwa District (Dodoma Region).
These are the districts with the lowest number of health
workers per capita, according to the 2001/2002 Human
Resources for Health Survey from the Ministry of Health
and Social Welfare [26] and the 2002 Population and
Housing Census [38].
Key informant interviews
In total, 21 interviews were carried out. In each of the five
districts, the District Medical Officer (DMO), the District
Human Resources Officer (DHRO) and the District Exec-
utive Director (DED) were interviewed. The informants
were chosen purposefully to benefit from their knowledge
based on their strategic positions in human resource man-
agement and health workforce planning. Fifteen in-depth
interviews were conducted at district level. The national
level informants were recruited from the central govern-
ment, the NGO sector, academia, and foreign develop-
ment partners with a stake in the health sector. Six
interviews were conducted at national level.
The initial plan was to get 18 informants from six districts,
and a total of 10 informants were planned to be recruited
at the national level. There was, however, evidence of rep-
etition of major emerging themes after completing the
interviews in five districts and interviews with the national
level informants, which indicated some "data saturation".
It was perceived that sufficient comprehensiveness of
responses and depth of knowledge had been ensured to
discontinue the inclusion of new informants.
An interview guide with open-ended questions was
employed during the interviews. New and important
issues that emerged in the course of the interviews were
added to this guide and were further explored in the sub-
sequent interviews. All the interviews were carried out face
to face in Swahili, the official language in Tanzania, except
one interview with an informant from an international
organisation. Both audio-taping and note-taking were
used to record the information.
Data analysis
Thematic content analysis was used on the data in an iter-
ative manner. Tape-recorded interviews were transcribed
word by word. Initial familiarisation with the data
through repeated review of transcripts and field-notes was
done at this stage. We employed multiple-coding, i.e.,
coding and interpretation of codes were carried out by dif-
ferent researchers [39]. Three researchers were involved in
this process. This was done in attempts to create codes and
categories that as closely as possible reflected the content
of the data. Concepts used by the informants rather than
the questions raised in the interview guide were employedBMC International Health and Human Rights 2009, 9:9 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-698X/9/9
Page 6 of 11
(page number not for citation purposes)
as codes [39]. The coding categories extracted from the
transcripts were used to analyse systematically topics that
were repeatedly mentioned in making up patterns of expe-
rience. Apparent contradictions emerging from the mate-
rial were singled out to allow for the comparison of the
information given by different informants.
Ethical considerations
Ethical clearance to conduct the study was obtained from
the National Institute for Medical Research (NIMR), Tan-
zania. Verbal consent was sought from prospective inter-
viewees after explaining the aims and methods of the
study, subsequently informing them of the research ethi-
cal principles of voluntary participation, the right of with-
drawal, and the principles of anonymity and
confidentiality.
Results
The results present the informants' experiences with the
decentralisation and the re-instated centralisation of
health worker recruitment. Before turning to these issues,
we start by briefly commenting on informants' general
experiences with the decentralisation reforms in the man-
agement of the district health services.
The implementation of decentralisation reforms was com-
mended by most of the informants in terms of increased
local participation in identifying needs for health care
delivery and financing. Decentralisation was also praised
for reducing the problem of mismatch between what the
districts actually need and that made available by central
government. The informants indicated that local priorities
related to social development sectors such as health, edu-
cation and water were to be reflected in the consolidated
district budget. In addition, the creation of District Health
Boards (DHB) and Council Health Management Teams
(CHMT) helped to improve the management of health
services. For example, under the decentralised arrange-
ment, the DHB in consultation with the CHMT and with
the approval of the District Council facilitated the use of
available funds in ways that had not been possible under
centralised government. In this case, decentralisation had
increased the flexibility in local planning and ownership
of health projects at the district level.
Decentralisation and recruitment of health workers
Planning according to need
It was consistently learnt that the recruitment process
under the decentralised arrangement was closely linked to
the budget process both at the local and at the central
level. During the process of estimating personnel emolu-
ment requirements, the District Executive Director's office
was reported to work in close collaboration with the Dis-
trict Medical Officer (DMO) to prepare the health worker
requirements for all health facilities in the district. The
officer-in-charge at each health facility in the district sub-
mitted the health personnel requirements to the DMO's
office. Supervisory visits completed by CHMT members to
health facilities provided another source of information
that identified the specific need for health workers.
The implementation of the decentralisation policy was
credited by a majority of the study informants as provid-
ing more room for district authorities to request what they
needed compared to the recruitment under centralisation,
whereby the central government would post health work-
ers to district without taking into consideration the spe-
cific needs of each district. Thus districts requiring more
health workers could very well end up receiving employ-
ees for other sectors instead.
The influence of local politics and patronage
While there was broad consensus that decentralised
recruitment of health workers is responsive to specific
local needs, some of the informants pointed out that
some influential local politicians in the District Council
interfered with the recruitment process. There were
reported cases of District Council members pushing for
the recruitment of categories of civil servants in line with
their relatives' qualifications, even when the district did
not need them. As one informant at district level indi-
cated:
"Some three to four years ago, I remember we requested
nurses and clinical officers to fill the gaps existing in our
health facilities, but the council had changed the budget to
look as if we needed more agricultural extension officers
while we actually demanded for health workers ... and it
has later on been learnt that some councillors had their rel-
atives who qualified as Agricultural Extension Officers
whom they wanted to be assured of employment."
In three districts where patronage in the conduct of local
politics was rife there were reports that the quality of the
district workforce was compromised by employment of
unqualified workers because of undue influence on the
recruitment process by district officials. Informants cited
instances of threats against health managers, such as the
District Medical Officer, if they did not comply with the
demands of the local politicians. This finding indicates
that the decentralised recruitment opened new avenues
for political influences on technical decisions related to
employment of health workers.
Complex and costly recruitment procedures
It was conceded by a majority of informants that the
recruitment procedures are complex and time-consuming,
and several informants referred to attempts at recruitment
that had failed. It was also explained that the time taken
from the request for the permit to the actual recruitment
was approximately one year. A recruitment permit has a
duration of only three months, and in many cases, theBMC International Health and Human Rights 2009, 9:9 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-698X/9/9
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informants claimed that the districts failed to recruit the
required health workers within the deadline. The reason
given was lack of responses from qualified applicants,
even after several advertisements of the vacant posts. In
particular, this was seen as a problem when a vacant posi-
tion required a highly skilled health worker. In general,
the complex bureaucratic procedures under the decentral-
ised arrangement were considered difficult and expensive
to manage, especially when the process needed to be
repeated due to failure to recruit in the first place, or
because the recruited candidates did not show up. One
informant noted that:
"You can get the qualified one, interview him and offer him
a letter of employment but he does not show up. Hence, you
need to restart the process of advertising, inviting appli-
cants, and convening interview panels, which all are
costly."
The majority of informants raised the concern that the
process of recruitment under the decentralisation system
with its inherent bureaucratic procedures, such as permit
processing by the central government, had contributed
not only to delays in recruiting health workers, but also to
increased costs of managing the process in the poorer
remote districts. It was suggested that in order to improve
recruitment under a decentralised setting, the Civil Service
Department should not attach stringent deadlines to the
recruitment permits.
Retention of health workers
The decentralised recruitment arrangement was praised as
being effective in terms of retaining the recruited health
workers, especially when the employees were recruited
from within the local or nearby districts. These individuals
would be fully aware of the working and living environ-
ment where they would start working, and therefore
would not be surprised by the lack of services. It was also
conceded by a majority of the informants that employees
posted by the central government would not have the
same commitment to work in a rural district as those who
had applied directly to the district authorities. As an exam-
ple, one informant stated:
"We may be sure that the job seekers have done a thorough
assessment of the work and living conditions of the place
they are about to go and work and convince themselves that
they will cope."
Other informants, especially at the national level, argued
that it is difficult to assess directly whether one recruit-
ment system is better than the other in relation to reten-
tion of workers.
In principle, decentralised recruitment may improve the
retention of both highly skilled health workers and lower
cadres, because employers can match the expectations of
prospective health workers to the actual living and work-
ing environment. However, a view shared by the majority
of informants was that qualified people, especially highly
skilled workers, were difficult both to recruit and retain
because they are in high demand in urban areas and the
private sector.
Another challenge mentioned was that health workers,
especially those who had an urban background, would
use the remote districts job vacancies as a bridge to getting
government employment in urban areas. This implies a
higher turnover and added costs of recruitment for the
remote districts. One informant pointed out that:
"Because living and working conditions in the villages are
not conducive, health workers, especially women, when
they are posted here they quickly start to make marriage
arrangements and secure marriage certificates with a hus-
band who lives in places such as Dar es Salaam. We are not
sure of the social and moral commitments surrounding
these marriages. Soon they start processing transfers for rea-
sons of family re-union. If the request is approved, the
worker then leaves our district. So in some cases, unattrac-
tive places, such as our district, are used as 'stepping stones'
to get employment in the public service."
Responsibility without authority
A thematic pattern that consistently emerged in the inter-
views was that districts are being assigned too many
responsibilities that do not match with the resources at
their disposal, a phenomenon described as 'responsibilities
without resources and authority". In relation to health per-
sonnel, there was a consistent concern that the authority
to manage health personnel issues is constantly overrid-
den by a number of central government organs with a
stake in the management of public servants. This, they
pointed out, leaves very little room for the district author-
ities to have a say in the management of their health work-
ers and seriously reduces the effectiveness of the
decentralised recruitment, retention and distribution of
workers across districts.
Most of the informants held the view that in order for
'decentralisation's good intentions' to be realised, exces-
sive and unnecessary central government interventions on
matters of otherwise local nature need to be removed.
They pointed out that the local authorities' limited power
and authority in decisions on matters such as using locally
mobilised finances to pay and motivate their health work-
ers is one of the key impediments to attracting and retain-
ing the required workers. If financial regulations are made
more flexible, there is a potential that health managers at
the local level can devise innovative ways of attracting
workers. One informant at the national level providedBMC International Health and Human Rights 2009, 9:9 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-698X/9/9
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this example of a local initiative in recruiting health work-
ers:
"There was one in-charge working with a District Desig-
nated Hospitals in one region who once came to the Minis-
try of Health to request the assistance of the ministry in
getting medical doctors for their hospital. The ministry
could not give the assistance required. The in-charge went
to Bugando University College of Health Sciences in
Mwanza Region and talked directly to the doctors. She told
them the benefits they would get by working with their hos-
pital in terms of both financial and non-financial incen-
tives. She finally succeeded to get four doctors who agreed
to go to that region after their graduation. If all district
councils were given the flexibility to directly spend some of
their resources to attract workers, many problems of short-
age in hard-to-staff districts would have been solved."
Distribution of health workers
Whilst the decentralised recruitment was praised as being
effective in recruiting and retaining health workers from
within the local and nearby districts, decentralisation was
however perceived to have aggravated pre-reform imbal-
ances in health worker distribution between the districts.
It was argued that the recruitment system had exacerbated
the competition for health workers among the districts,
and between local and central government employers.
The remote districts come out as losers in this process. It
was learnt from informants that the failure of remote dis-
tricts to recruit was due to costly and complex procedures
surrounding the decentralised recruitment process, com-
bined with the relatively small financial resources and
weak institutional capacity of these districts.
Centralised recruitment in a decentralised health sector
As described above, since 2006 the central government
has intervened in the recruitment of teachers, accountants
and health workers. Many informants described the rein-
stated central recruitment as being 'operationally compli-
mentary' to the decentralisation reforms, because it has
helped districts to get more highly skilled health workers
in a relatively easy way compared to the previous, decen-
tralised arrangement. Furthermore, the new system seems
to have reduced the cost of the recruitment process related
to advertisements, interviewing etc., which would other-
wise be shouldered by local governments.
Compared to the decentralised system of recruitment, the
re-instated central recruitment of health workers was per-
ceived by a large majority of the study participants to be
more effective in balancing health worker distribution
across districts as it has additional mechanisms for ensur-
ing that health workers are distributed relative to the
needs of the districts. However, informants also explained
that some of those who are deployed to rural districts fail
to turn up, e.g. for reasons related to employment in the
private health sector or for personal reasons. One inform-
ant at district level remarked:
"In the financial year 2006/2007 the central government
has posted five clinical officers to come to work in our dis-
trict, but it was only two who reported and stayed, and the
Ministry of Health and Social Welfare did not do any fol-
low-up to see whether the posted health workers reported or
not. We had several times tried to communicate this prob-
lem of non-reporting to the ministry, but nothing has so far
occurred."
A majority of the informants did believe that there was a
need for a division of responsibilities between the districts
and the central government in matters related to recruit-
ment and distribution of health workers. Highly skilled
health workers, such as medical officers, dentists, radiog-
raphers and laboratory technicians, are hard to find in
remote rural districts, and informants believed it is impor-
tant that the central government manages the whole proc-
ess of recruitment and distribution of these particular
categories of health workers. The recruitment of unskilled
health workers, on the other hand, was said to be very well
managed by the decentralised districts because these cate-
gories of health workers could easily be obtained within
the district or from nearby districts.
Discussion
Whilst the existing literature on the impact of decentrali-
sation in the health sector has largely focused on resource
management in general and its impact on health system
performance [11-13,16-18,37], our research highlights
the ways in which decentralisation may affect the recruit-
ment and distribution of health personnel. We have also
attempted to add to the present knowledge-base by juxta-
posing the different historic periods in Tanzania, contrast-
ing decentralised recruitment with a more centralised
recruitment process.
The results have indicated that, while decentralised
recruitment provides opportunities for a more responsive
planning of health workers as it is sensitive to local needs,
three key issues continue to be stumbling blocks for effec-
tive and efficient recruitment of health workers to remote
districts. The first relates to the limited power and author-
ity vested to district authorities to manage complex health
personnel issues. This challenge was referred to by our
informants as 'responsibilities without authority'. One
explanation of this challenge is that decentralisation in
Tanzania, not the least that part pertaining to the manage-
ment of health workers, can at best be characterised as a
partial decentralisation. Informants reported unnecessary
interference from a number of central government organs
in the management of human resources. Braathen et al.BMC International Health and Human Rights 2009, 9:9 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-698X/9/9
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[18] compared Tanzania with Uganda and concluded that
Tanzania is lagging behind Uganda in terms of the
amount of autonomy the central government had relin-
quished to the local governments. In a study of bottle-
necks in the recruitment process in Tanzania, Martineau
[19] identified complex, long and bureaucratic personnel
deployment processes as one reason for delays and some-
times failure to recruit health workers in hard-to-staff
parts of the country. A report by Blunder [40] presented
similar observations.
Some informants argued that increased local autonomy to
spend locally mobilised resources would reduce the prob-
lem of recruiting health workers in remote districts,
because this would empower districts to design incentive
mechanisms that could attract the workers. While this
might be the case if only the remote districts got this
opportunity, it is more doubtful that the same would be
the case if increased autonomy were extended to all dis-
tricts. As long as districts compete for scarce health work-
ers, resource deprived districts are likely to lose out.
Second, decentralisation in Tanzania took place in the
midst of weak local institutions that could easily be
manipulated by local elites to marshal their personal
interests. Local politicians were initially given wide pow-
ers to manage the recruitment process at the district level.
The legal powers of local politicians in the recruitment
process were reduced by the Public Service Act number 8
of 2002 [41] and its corresponding Public Service Regula-
tions of 2003 [42]. However, our results indicate that
some local politicians remain influential in the recruit-
ment process through more informal mechanisms,
including threats.
The third stumbling block relates to bureaucratic con-
straints, such as the long process of requesting employ-
ment permits necessary for recruitment of health workers.
According to the informants, this causes both delays in the
recruitment and additional costs, especially in the remote
areas where the recruitment process often has to be
repeated due to the short duration of employment per-
mits, failure of recruited candidates to show up, and the
generally high turnover rate of skilled health workers.
Some of the identified problems related to recruitment of
health workers may well be attributed to the fact that the
decentralisation reforms in Tanzania were implemented
without adequate preparations. Kolehmainen-Aitken [43]
has pointed out that in many countries, managers who
were supposed to implement decentralisation reforms
were not only untrained and ill-prepared, but were also
working in a context of weak personnel systems. One rea-
son for lack of adequate preparations may be opposition
from bureaucrats in the central administration. Gilson
and Mills [16] have indicated that, during the initiation
and design phase of the decentralisation policy in Tanza-
nia and Papua New Guinea, the opposition from centrally
positioned bureaucrats undermined the decentralisation
process due to fears of losing power and prestige; they
allowed weak governance structures to strengthen the role
of the centre instead of enhancing effective local govern-
ment structures. For instance, no mechanisms were put in
place to help the perceived unattractive employers to
recruit qualified (health) workers. Youlong et al. [22] have
similarly argued that, amidst stiff competition for health
workers as a result of implementing decentralisation
reforms in China, there were no effective mechanisms for
attracting and retaining health workers in remote areas.
Similar concerns were raised by our informants.
The opposition by bureaucrats to fully implement the
reform policies may have been fuelled by the fact that
decentralisation reforms were strongly pushed by foreign
donors. Wang et al. [21] and Werlin [44] have argued that
the driving forces for decentralisation in the health sector
of most low and middle income countries did not always
come from the health sector itself. In addition, the early
reformers often provided little room for consultations
with the health sector stakeholders [13,21]. Bossert and
Beauvais [13] have indicated that the Ministry of Health at
the Philippines was inadequately consulted at the time of
the design and initiation of the decentralisation reforms,
a phenomenon that led to a number of implementation
problems related (but not limited) to the management of
human resources. In Tanzania, the implementation of
decentralisation reform was carried out when the govern-
ment was responding to the pressure from international
financial institutions such as the World Bank, and the
reform was tied by the aid conditionality from the donors.
Our results further indicate that centralised recruitment
may be more effective in both recruiting highly skilled
health workers and distributing them across districts rela-
tive to the reported needs, although doubts were reported
of the effectiveness of the central recruitment system in
ensuring that the recruited health workers stay in the dis-
trict to which they are posted. This somewhat rosy picture
painted by health managers of the 'goodness' of central-
ised recruitment needs to be interpreted with some cau-
tion. First, it might be the health managers' confession of
despair after their failure to attract and retain health work-
ers in their districts, whereas the real problem is that these
districts are simply not attractive enough to prospective
job seekers. Second, the positive attitudes towards more
centralised recruitment may be due to the partial nature of
the decentralisation reforms which, as evidenced by our
findings, had left health managers with little power and
authority to effectively manage the recruitment and reten-
tion of health workers. The partial recentralisation mayBMC International Health and Human Rights 2009, 9:9 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-698X/9/9
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thus be seen as a way to alleviate the problems caused by
the partial decentralisation.
Weakness of the study
One weakness of our study might be that we consulted
only the most poorly staffed districts. There may exist rel-
atively resource poor districts that have been relatively
more successful in attracting health workers under the
decentralised system. Their experiences might have shed
further light on the importance of the local endowments
of resources for the ability to attract workers. Furthermore,
the informants' views about the counterfactuals – for
instance, what would have happened if districts were
entrusted with even greater local autonomy – should be
interpreted with caution.
Except for differences in views about the impact of decen-
tralisation on the retention of health workers, this study
found little disagreement amongst informants about the
issues that were discussed. This could be strength, but it
could also be an indication that the group of recruited
informants was too homogeneous.
Conclusion
Decentralisation reforms in Tanzania have resulted in
more effective utilisation of local information in the
recruitment of health workers, ensuring better planning
according to need. However, bureaucracy and delays in
the recruitment processes remain important problems.
Moreover, decentralisation reforms have created new
forms of competition for scarce human resources, includ-
ing health workers. Such competition may increase pre-
reform imbalances in the distribution of health workers,
especially when the recruitment process is complex and
costly and poorly staffed districts have less financial
resources and a weak institutional capacity compared to
other districts. In order to prevent or mitigate such out-
comes, a 'hybrid' form of recruitment where the central
government plays a role as 'facilitator' could be an opti-
mal solution.
An alternative to the hybrid model would be to more
directly address the underlying problems to which the
hybrid form is responding, by a) reducing the cost of the
recruitment process to give greater autonomy to the
decentralised districts, and b) endowing poorer districts
with added financial resources and greater institutional
capacity. To add to the effect of b), districts can also be
given increased financial autonomy so that they can be
flexible enough to devise innovative ways of attracting
and retaining health workers. One such innovation, men-
tioned by our informants, would be to recruit health
workers on short term contracts by using locally mobi-
lised financial resources to cover salary costs while waiting
for the result of the normal, long and bureaucratic process
of recruiting workers on a permanent basis.
We should emphasise that the optimal way to organise
the recruitment of health workers will strongly depend on
contextual factors. Further research will be needed to
identify how to optimally balance the involvement of the
central government against the autonomy of local author-
ities in each particular setting.
Finally, the organisation of recruitment process is, of
course, only one of the factors that affect the distribution
of health workers. In addition to effective recruitment pro-
cedures, special incentive packages may also be needed in
order to ensure a more equitable distribution of health
workers in low income settings, especially where the local
districts differ greatly in terms of the living conditions
they are able to offer to prospective job seekers.
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